I. Background and Conceptual Framework
The quality of medical care in America has been the focus of considerable attention in recent years. Highly publicized reports have made the shortcomings of the American health care delivery system more transparent. One branch of that literature has focused on patient safety and medical errors, catalyzed by the Institute of Medicine's To Err is Human report [IOM, (1999) ].
Another branch of literature has focused on the quality of medical care generally, and finds that Americans often fail to receive health treatments and services considered appropriate by medical experts [McGlynn et al., (2003) , IOM, (2001)]. These findings suggest the importance of understanding the determinants of quality and errors so these shortcomings can be addressed.
Attention to quality is nothing new. Researchers have been investigating the quality of medical care for decades [Donebedian, (1980) ]. Much of the early quality literature focused on health care providers, particularly hospital care. However, as managed care has grown, the focus has expanded to include the quality of care provided to health plan enrollees. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) have attracted most of the attention because the link between health care financing and health care delivery is stronger in HMOs than in other forms of managed care. While there are many types of HMO models, most plans have restricted provider networks and utilize the primary care physician (PCP) as the point-of-referral for specialist care and for expensive diagnostic or therapeutic services. Many HMOs are also engaged in care management activities, aggressively developing (or contracting for) programs for the management of chronic illnesses, and to manage the health needs of members with multiple comorbidities. Hence, sophisticated HMOs may be well equipped to ensure that members receive appropriate preventive, chronic and acute care.
Concern about the potential adverse influence that HMOs might have on quality has fueled efforts to measure and report quality at the health plan level. Most of these efforts have utilized the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS), and the Consumer Assessment of Health Plan Survey (CAHPS). HEDIS includes approximately 60 clinical care process compliance and outcomes measures evaluating preventive and chronic illness care, access and utilization. CAHPS is a survey based set of quality indicators measuring consumers' self-reported experience and satisfaction with their health care and health plan. HEDIS and CAHPS form the basis of many health plan report cards and are often required as a condition of contracting by both private employers and public purchasers.
Research investigating factors related to the quality of care provided by HMOs has focused on specific health plan or enrollee traits (e.g., plan ownership status and financial performance, age, gender, and income distribution of the population, and race/ethnicity of plan enrollment) but has not incorporated market traits such as HMO competition [Born and Simon (2001) , Himmelstein et al., (1999) , Landon et al., (2001) , Zaslavsky et al., (2000c) ]. Other literature has examined the percentage of variation in health plan performance on HEDIS and CAHPS measures attributable to the region, the market, or the health plan, without relating the variance to specific plan or market attributes [Zaslavsky et al., (2000b)] . A recent review of the literature concurred that no studies have examined the relationship between health plan quality and HMO competition while controlling for other important covariates [Morrissey, (2001) ].
Since this review, one unpublished study has used cross-sectional data and latent variable modeling to examine whether market and plan characteristics are related to HEDIS and CAHPS performance [Scanlon et al., (2003) ].
Understanding the correlates of HMO quality and the factors affecting quality improvement is important for understanding the most effective means of achieving improvement.
Moreover, understanding whether competition and other market characteristics will drive improvement is crucial to understanding whether desired quality improvements are best achieved by regulatory or market approaches. Just as market structure is a central component of price theory, with the existing literature relating the financial outcomes of providers to market characteristics [Feldman et al., (1996) , Wholey et al., (1996 ), Feldman et al., (1990 ], so too should health plan quality be reflective of market traits, because like price, quality is an endogenous outcome of the competitive process.
Economic theory is equivocal regarding the impact of competition on quality or the relationship between quality and health plan costs [McLaughlin & Ginsburg, (1998)] . The extent to which market forces influence health plan quality depends on the relative value consumers place on quality vs. costs, the extent to which better quality is costly to achieve (some contend better quality actually reduces costs), the business objectives of health plans, and the availability of accurate information about quality.
We hypothesize that plan performance and improvement on the HEDIS and CAHPS measures is a function of health plan competition and managed care penetration. HMO competition is potentially important since HEDIS and CAHPS are now commonly required as part of contracting by employers, and since some employers provide employees with comparative HEDIS and CAHPS information and in some cases even adjust employee out-ofpocket premiums based on how plans' score on these measures [Scanlon et al., (2002) ]. HMO penetration is important since providers are usually contractually affiliated with several HMOs, and since aggregate physician practice patterns may converge towards compliance with the HEDIS indicators as HMOs become more prevalent in the marketplace [Chernew et al., (2003) ].
Since large employers and the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) have been major proponents of HEDIS and CAHPS, we hypothesize that plans' may pay more attention to improving these measures in markets with significant large employer presence.
In this paper we relate health plan performance on six HEDIS measures to market characteristics, controlling for health plan traits and market demographics. We seek to identify specific market and plan characteristics that are associated with favorable performance and longitudinal improvement. Unlike Scanlon et al. (2003) , we use a four year panel to examine whether HMO competition and HMO penetration are related to better plan performance and quality improvement.
II. Methods
Our empirical model follows the random growth models estimated in the earnings literature where variations in earnings over time are decomposed into level and growth components (Lillard and Weiss, 1979; Hause, 1980) . These models also allow the level and growth components to be correlated. Thus in our model plans that start at high levels of quality may grow less quickly. Specifically, we model the performance of health plan 'i' at time 't', (q it ), as a function of plan and market traits (X it ). Since certain plan and market traits may be associated with improved performance over time, we permit the coefficients for each covariate to follow a linear time trend (T). Formally the model can be expressed as:
where u it is a stochastic error term. We partition the error, u it into an iid component (ν it ), and a random component ( i η ), where i η accounts for unmeasured variations among plans in quality.
We also allow the error to follow an AR(1) process, such that: There might be important unobserved plan characteristics that could influence a plan's ability to improve its performance on the HEDIS measures over time. We allow the coefficient on T (which measures the extent to which plans improve over time) to incorporate a plan specific random effect ( ). Plans providing a single year of data were also included in the sample. However, a majority of the plans provide multiple years of data which help us identify both the variance and correlation in the growth and level components. After making the appropriate substitutions, the final model we estimate is:
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood methods and we seek to estimate the following parameters: , , ,
If we ignore the AR(1) process for a moment:
is average effect of unit change in X on mean quality score.
is change in that effect over time.
To get a sense of how well our model does in predicting variations in performance across plans, we can decompose the total variation in quality into a component that is explained by the X's and a component that is unmeasured (equation 4). This allows us to compute a pseudo Rsquared.
III. Data and Sample
The primary data sources used to derive the analytic sample were NCQA's HEDIS data and the Interstudy Corporation's MSA Profiler and Competitive Edge (calendar year 1998-2001) data. In addition, other data sources were used as supplements (Table 1) In each year, about 30-35% of HMO and POS plans operating in the United States do not report data (either publicly or non-publicly) to NCQA. In calendar year 1999, 37% of reporting plans were HMOs, while 56% of the plans were HMOs with POS options. The other 7% of plans were listed as POS plans and were dropped because comparable data was not available from Interstudy. For our analysis we included any plan reporting in one or more of the four years of our panel. Table 3 lists the percentage of plans reporting multiple years of data for each measure. Essentially, plans providing only one year of data would only influence the average effect estimates (i.e., the α 0 's) but not the growth estimates (i.e., the α 1 's)
Since NCQA and Interstudy do not use common health plan identification codes, we merged these two data sources manually, relying primarily on the health plan name, the state of service, and the MSA(s) the plan served. Statistics from these merges indicate that we were able to match about 92% of the NCQA observations with an Interstudy observation in any given year.
While the number of plans reporting data to NCQA represented only 56% of the universe of health plan-MSA combinations contained in Interstudy in 1999, these NCQA plans accounted for 72% of the total pure commercial enrollment in the United States. Even though Interstudy and NCQA each use their own common plan identification codes to link plans over time, facilitating the longitudinal merging of the data, we also performed manual checks of the data since there was a high rate of plan mergers, acquisitions, and name changes during this four year period of HMO consolidation.
We include the following plan traits in the model; profit status, HMO model type, plan age, whether the plan allows NCQA to publicly report the HEDIS data, and the data collection method used for each HEDIS measure. These were selected because they are commonly used in the literature and are routinely collected. reported (e.g., a change of greater than 40 percentage points in absolute value for plans reporting data for all four years for a measure) was erroneous. Because we were concerned that these observations would influence our estimates, they are dropped from the results that we report here.
Tables 3 provides information about our sample and the number of plans reporting data for the four measures for which we observed four years of data, and the two measures for which we observed three years of data. The table reveals that there is variation in the number of years of data reported by plans for each measure, allowing us to identify key parameters in the model. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the six HEDIS measures included in our analysis. The tables suggests that the mean value for each measure increased over time, ranging from improvement of three percentage points for the breast cancer screening rate to eleven percentage points for the adolescent immunization rate. However, the statistics in Table 4 mask the degree of change over time for a given plan, so table 5 presents the results of the average plan change for each measure over time for plans reporting all eligible years of data for a given measure.
Similarly, Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for the covariates that we include in the growth and fixed effects models that we estimated, for all years of data. The table indicates that firms faced slightly more competition over time (1 = monopoly) and slightly less HMO penetration.
About 75% of the plans were for-profit organizations, while the majority of plans were IPA/Network or mixed model HMOs. The rate of public reporting to NCQA increased over time from 55% to 83%, and the average per-capita income for the MSAs plans' served was about $28,000. Table 7 Plans that publicly report their data have consistently higher scores than those that do not, suggesting a 'selection' phenomenon around reporting. Finally, plans that report data using the hybrid method have a 5.6 point higher score for breast cancer screening and over 25 point higher score on childhood immunization, 28 points higher on adolescent immunization and 11 points higher on Beta Blocker scores. These large differences for the immunization and beta blocker rates probably reflect the difficulty of capturing utilization of these services from administrative claims databases relative to patient charts. Experienced (older) plans also have higher quality scores for all six measures. Each additional year a plan has been in operation increases mean quality scores from between 0.14 to 0.5 percentage points. In addition, for the childhood immunization and adolescent MMR measures, plans improve their scores by about 13 percentage points each year.
IV. Results

How well do our covariates predict variations in quality across plans? Equation 4
provides some indication where the total variation in quality at any one point in time can be separated into a component that is explained by the covariates and a component that is not.
When the "pseudo-R2" is computed for 1999, it ranges from a low of 0.15 for breast cancer screening to a high of 0.32 for adolescent immunization.
The relationship between plan and market traits and performance appears to be stable over time. The coefficients that allow the relationship between performance and the covariates to follow a linear time trend (the 's) are generally not statistically different from 0 and no interesting patterns emerge, except that for the child and adolescent immunization rates, the effect of using the hybrid reporting method appears to wane over time. For example, in the case of childhood immunization, the scores on hybrid reporting plans are only 12 points higher in 1999 than the scores on non-hybrid reporting plans while the difference was 25 points in 1998.
While the effect of plan and market characteristics don't appear to change over time, this finding might be driven by within group correlation in the X's. To explore the extent to which this is true, we divided our set of covariates into three groups: group 1 was the competition variables, group 2 was the market socio-demographic variables, and group 3 was the plan level variables.
Likelihood ratio tests on the joint significance of the variables in each of those groups were conducted. Table 8 presents results from Likelihood ratio tests for the stability of parameter estimates over time (the ). The LR tests also support the hypothesis that the relationship between the competition measures and performance is stable over time. At the 5 percent level of significance, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the competition coefficients (i.e., group 1)are jointly zero for all the measures. However, the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the market socio-demographic variables (i.e., group 2) are jointly equal to zero can be rejected for 1 α 1 ' s α both the cancer screening measures. Likewise, we can also reject the null hypothesis of zero coefficients on the health plan variables (i.e., group 3) for the cervical cancer screening rate and the two immunization rates.
Although the estimates of the AR(1) parameter ρ 1 did not converge in all models, the estimates of this parameter for the cancer screening rates suggests that the parameter was small and the results reported above are not substantially changed when the model is estimated without the AR(1) assumption. The estimate of δη ρ suggests a strong inverse relationship between base level performance and improvement in performance, such that plans which performed well in 1998 had slower improvements over the study period. 
V. Discussion
Estimates from our HEDIS growth model suggest that the most significant predictors of health plan performance on the six HEDIS measures examined are plan tax status, plan age, the data collection method used by the health plan, and whether the plan allowed NCQA to report its data publicly. MSA socio-demographic variables such as the percentage of non-white population and per capita income also achieve significance for some of the HEDIS measures.
However, one of our principle measures of interest, HMO competition, was not significantly related to health plan performance for any of the HEDIS measures examined.
There has been a fair amount of discussion in the health economics literature regarding the measurement of managed care competition [Baker, (2001) ], and it may be that our measure is not capturing competition appropriately, rather than the case of competition being unimportant. In particular, it may be important to consider the role of alternative insurance products such as preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and other more 'loosely' managed products when thinking about how to measure competition in insurance markets.
In addition, one avenue we intend to pursue is the inclusion of measures that capture the lagged relative deviation of the HEDIS scores among plans within markets, under the assumption that plans are aware of how their competitors are performing, and strive to not look significantly worse than the best performing plan within the market. Unlike competition, managed care penetration is positively related to HEDIS performance for four of the six measures, which suggests convergence in performance as HMO prevalence increases. However, this result could also be driven by overlapping provider networks, so future work should consider the underlying reasons for the effect of HMO penetration. While our model allowed the impact of the covariates to change over time, our estimates suggest that the importance of the covariates for plan quality is relatively stable over time. However, we do find evidence that plans with higher levels of initial performance experience less growth over time.
Our findings should be considered preliminary and are subject to several limitations.
First, we only used a small number of HEDIS measures, and we have yet to include the CAHPS measures, which are based on consumer reported satisfaction with their health plan and health care. We plan to conduct additional estimation that will include some of the survey based CAHPS measures, and we will test the sensitivity of our results by using additional HEDIS measures as well. Second, our models estimate the effects of measures separately, which makes it difficult to get an overall sense of the relationship between plan 'quality' and the covariates of interest when there are many performance measures. We overcome this problem in crosssectional work by using the multiple measures to estimate latent variable models [Scanlon et al., (2003) ], hence future work will explore the estimation of longitudinal latent growth models, though estimation using a panel requires strict assumptions about the stability of the measures comprising the latent variables, and the degree of influence that each measure has on the latent construct.
Though preliminary, our results have potentially important policy implications for those interested in increasing quality generally, and HMO performance specifically. Many policy analysts have speculated that the combination of increased HMO competition and the availability of standardized quality information should lead to better performance on measurable aspects of quality. Our preliminary results do not support the hypothesis that performance improves more rapidly in highly competitive markets, but we do find evidence that performance is better where
HMOs are more prevalent. While the effect of HMO penetration may be due to overlapping provider networks, it may also be due to increased acceptance within the medical community of population health management approaches. In any event, with the trend in commercial insurance moving away from plans that tightly integrate health care financing and delivery towards discounted fee-for-service arrangements, it is important to understand whether competition among alternative insurance products (e.g., HMOs v. PPOs) verses competition among similar insurance products (e.g., among HMOs) has a differential impact on quality.
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